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Abstract 
The enactment of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand would have significant 
implications for the process of appointing judges. This essay contends that the present 
judicial appointments system is insufficiently transparent and offers too few 
safeguards to prevent judicial appointments from becoming politicised. It draws on 
Canada's experience after enacting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to 
illustrate why reform is needed. Ultimately, it is contended that the adoption of a 
supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand should be accompanied by the creation of a 
judicial appointments commission. 
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I Introduction 
The enactment of a supreme law Bill of Rights Act (BORA) would have significant 
implications for New Zealand's system of appointing judges. At present, judges cannot 
strike down legislation as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is an ordinary 
statute that is not supreme to other laws. If this were changed, judges would be able to 
invalidate legislation which was inconsistent with fundamental rights and freedoms. 
This would make the judiciary a more powerful branch of government and would 
involve judges more prominently in political and policy disputes, increasing the 
incentive for governments to improperly appoint judges based on political factors. 
The adoption of a supreme law BORA would therefore raise significant questions 
about the process by which judges are appointed. This paper examines whether the 
present appointments system is sufficiently transparent and democratic and whether it 
would effectively safeguard judicial independence once judges become the final 
arbiters of rights-based disputes.  
The first part of this paper sets out how the role of judges would be altered by a 
supreme law BORA and, in particular, what is meant by the oft-stated charge that 
judicial appointments will subsequently become politicised. It then examines New 
Zealand's present system of appointments, where the Attorney-General is responsible 
for selecting judges. The integrity of key actors is shown to be the main safeguard 
against improperly political appointments. 
Drawing on Canada's experience after the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(the Charter) was enacted, this paper then contends that the existing appointments 
system should not be retained if a supreme law BORA is adopted. The present process 
lacks transparency and provides insufficient safeguards to ensure public confidence in 
the political neutrality of appointments. The Canadian experience provides several 
conclusions about how the reform of judicial appointments should be undertaken. 
Given the conclusion that change is needed, the final parts of this paper evaluate the 
advantages and disadvantages of various options for reform. This analysis illustrates 
the tension that exists between several of the goals that reform of judicial appointments 
seeks to achieve. Ultimately, if a supreme law BORA is to be enacted, it is contended 
that an appointments commission which recommends a shortlist of candidates, from 
which the Attorney-General selects who to appoint, should be adopted. 
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II A Supreme Law Bill Of Rights for New Zealand 
A New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is designed to protect the public from the 
encroachment of fundamental rights by the government. The Act has had a powerful 
effect on Parliament and the process of law-making by requiring that the Attorney-
General report to the House of Representatives on whether a Bill is inconsistent with 
the Act.1 It has also affected statutory interpretation by mandating that judges interpret 
statutes in a manner consistent with the protected rights.2  
Despite these substantial effects, the original proposal was for an Act of higher or 
supreme law status, entrenched to require a special process for amendment.3 This 
would have allowed courts to invalidate legislation which was inconsistent with the 
Act. It was not enacted at the time because of opposition4 but a sense of unfinished 
business and the possibility that New Zealand will eventually amend the Act to have 
supreme law status remains. Although this change is not inevitable, it certainly 
remains possible. Sir Geoffrey Palmer referred to the "constitutional caravan" moving 
on in suggesting that the time may have come for this reform to occur.5  
This paper does not address the desirability of this reform, a matter which has been the 
subject of extensive academic debate. Instead, it assumes that a supreme law BORA is 
to be adopted and addresses a collateral issue associated with that reform, which has 
not received academic attention: the implications of a supreme law BORA for New 
Zealand's system of appointing judges. To assess this issue, it is assumed that the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in its present form would be amended to have 
  
1  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 7. These reports can be found on the Ministry of Justice 
website <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
2  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6. For further discussion on this see J F Burrows and R I 
Carter Statute Law in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at 332–383. 
3  See A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper [1985] AJHR A6.  
4  See, for example, New Zealand Law Society "Submissions on the White Paper: A Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand" (20 December 1985).   
5  Geoffrey Palmer "The Bill of Rights After Twenty-One Years: The New Zealand Constitutional 
Caravan Moves On?" (2013) 11 NZJPIL 260. 
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supreme law status, therefore the same rights and freedoms as presently protected 
would be upheld as higher law.6 
B What Would Change? 
The fundamental change brought by a supreme law BORA is the ability of courts to 
strike down laws that are repugnant to the rights contained within it. In determining 
whether to invalidate legislation, the courts would consider whether the breach of 
rights was "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".7 This section 
assesses the significance of that new power for New Zealand's judges.  
From one point of view, this reform would not have a significant impact on the role of 
judges. This is because judges already possess significantly more power compared to 
the other branches of government than in the past, notwithstanding the absence of a 
supreme law BORA. Judges are generally bolder today and more willing to develop 
the law than they once were.8 This is shown, for example, through the development of 
judicial review of administrative action;9 the use of purposive rather than plain-
meaning approaches to interpreting legal texts;10 and the view that constitutional 
documents should be interpreted as living organisms that can change to "keep pace 
with civilisation".11    
  
6  There has been significant academic commentary on whether other rights should be protected 
within the Act, but that is outside the scope of this paper. See, for example, the argument of Butler 
and Butler on the protection of social and economic rights, property rights and the right to privacy: 
Andrew Butler and Petra Butler "Protecting Rights" in Caroline Morris, Jonathan Boston and Petra 
Butler (eds) Reconstituting the Constitution (Springer Verlag, Berlin, 2011) 157. 
7  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 4. 
8  Geoffrey Palmer "Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive" in 
BD Gray and RB McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Brookers, 
Wellington, 1995) 11 at 16–17. 
9  Paul East "A Judicial Commission" [1995] NZLJ 189 at 189.  
10  James Allan "Judicial Appointments in New Zealand: If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere 
well it were done openly and directly" in Kate Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing 
Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 103 at 109.  
11  Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) at 271 per Cooke P. For an earlier 
example of the Court of Appeal's expansive approach towards the Treaty of Waitangi, see New 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA). 
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The second rationale for this view stems from the nature of the protected rights. Sir 
Kenneth Keith notes that the included rights are generally procedural rather than 
substantive. This, he suggests, goes some way to avoiding the difficulties associated 
with unconfined rights, like an equal protection clause, that give judges the ability to 
second guess the executive and legislature on the end goals of policy and the way 
those ends are pursued.12 Palmer also noted that the civil and political rights presently 
protected are of "a different and more limited character" than social and economic 
rights.13 
Notwithstanding this argument, a supreme law BORA is still likely to have a 
substantial impact on the role of judges. Enactment of the Charter has had significant 
implications for Canada's judges. Former Chief Justice of Canada Antonio Lamer said 
"the Charter has changed our job descriptions"14 and that the Charter forces judges to 
make what were formerly political decisions.15 Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin 
expressed similar sentiments, contending that the Charter "turned the tables of 
power"16 and noting that the Charter forced courts "to grapple with a whole range of 
hitherto unlitigable issues, many involving social and moral questions of profound 
importance and difficulty".17 
Examples of major Charter cases that have arisen in Canada include striking down a 
reverse onus provision;18 striking down a provision criminalising abortion;19 and 
decisions which concerned gay rights20 and indigenous rights.21 Other cases have dealt 
with mandatory retirement, Sunday shopping and hate propaganda.22 It is foreseeable 
that cases could emerge on these and similarly prominent and controversial issues in 
  
12  Kenneth Keith "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: Judicial Review versus Democracy" (1985) 11 
NZULR 307 especially at 315–316.  
13  Palmer, above n 5, at 268. 
14  James Walker "Race," Rights and the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, Waterloo, 1997) at 325. 
15  FL Morton "Judicial Recruitment and Selection" in FL Morton (ed) Law, Politics and the Judicial 
Process in Canada (3rd ed, University of Calgary Press, Calgary, 2002) 117 at 128. 
16  Beverly McLachlin "The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary" (1991) Alta L Rev 540 at 540. 
17  McLachlin, above n 16, at 543.  
18  R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30. 
19  R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. 
20  Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493. 
21  R v Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
22  See McLachlin, above n 16, at 542. 
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New Zealand. Therefore, enacting a supreme law BORA is likely to have a 
considerable impact on the role of judges. It would give them greater power vis-à-vis 
the legislature and force them to decide cases on issues that were formerly political 
matters.  
Commentators have recognised that the adoption of a supreme law BORA will raise 
questions about the present system of appointments. A report by Chen Palmer for then 
Attorney-General Margaret Wilson suggested that, were New Zealand to adopt this 
reform, "a different approach to the role of the Executive in the appointment and 
removal of judges might be a necessary consideration as part of wider constitutional 
reform".23 Similarly, Keith suggested that:24 
The question whether the Bill should be entrenched … sharpens issues about the 
use of courts to pursue political purposes … As the perception of a court's 
political role is heightened, greater attention focuses on the judicial appointment 
process and matters of tenure.  
The issue is whether the present appointments system will remain fit for purpose once 
judges have new and significantly wider powers. Will the system enhance public 
confidence in the independence of the judiciary and judges' suitability to decide BORA 
cases? Is the process sufficiently transparent and inclusive so as to avoid the 
perception of a democratic deficit? A prominent part of this issue is the concern that 
judicial appointments will be politicised. Adopting a supreme law BORA increases the 
incentive for the government to appoint judges for political reasons, to ensure that the 
courts will uphold the government's values and not overturn its legislative 
achievements. Consequently, one of the main issues associated with a supreme law 
BORA is how to protect judicial independence and prevent the politicisation of 
judicial appointments, a concept which is examined more closely in the next section.  
  
23  Chen Palmer & Partners "Memorandum to the Hon Margaret Wilson, Attorney-General: Judicial 
Administration Issues" (1 November 2002) at [55].  
24  Kenneth Keith "Concerning Change: The Adoption and Implementation of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990" (2000) 31 VUWLR 721 at 743. 
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C The Politicisation of Judicial Appointments 
Judicial independence is a fundamental element of the rule of law.25 It is essential in a 
liberal democracy that the public are confident their disputes will be resolved 
according to the law; judges must rule without "fear or favour, affection or ill will".26 
Judges' salaries may not be reduced during their commission,27 and security of tenure, 
a "cornerstone" of judicial independence, is protected in statute.28 These mechanisms 
protect sitting judges from improper influence by the legislature or executive. 
However, judicial independence must be protected from the outset – that is, in the way 
judges are appointed. As the Economist editorialised, "the independence of the 
judiciary depends on the way judges are selected".29  
Concern is often expressed that the judiciary and judicial appointments risk becoming 
politicised if judges can strike down legislation. Yet despite the frequency with which 
this issue is raised, there is little literature examining what is meant by the concept of 
"politicised judicial appointments". Some commentators treat the general increase in 
the power of the courts in relation to the legislature, or the perception that judges are 
more activist today than in the past, as evidence of politicisation.30 However, the focus 
here is on accusations that judicial appointments – not the role of judges generally – 
may become politicised.  
  
25  Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2014) at 797.  
26  Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s18.  
27  Constitution Act 1986, s 24.  
28  Philip A Joseph "Appointment, discipline and removal of Judges in New Zealand" in HP Lee (ed) 
Judiciaries in Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 66 at 77. 
See, for superior court judges, Constitution Act 1986, s 23. For District Court judges, see District 
Courts Act 1947, s 7. This provision is replicated with some variation in the constituent statutes of 
the other various inferior courts.  
29  Economist (Nov 15 2003), as cited in Peter McCormick "Selecting the Supremes: The 
Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada" (2005) 7 J App Prac & Process 1 at 28. 
Also see Martin Friedland "Appointment, discipline and removal of judges in Canada" in HP Lee 
(ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 46 at 
51. 
30  See for example Brian Galligan and Peter Russell "The Politicisation of the Judiciary in Australia 
and Canada" (1995) 67 The Australian Quarterly 85.  
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It is clear that judicial appointments cannot be made on the basis of a candidate's 
political affiliation or membership of a particular political party. Rewarding or 
punishing a candidate for this reason is unacceptable; Kate Malleson refers to the need 
to select judges on the basis of merit rather than political patronage.31 In New Zealand, 
this issue is partly sidestepped as it would likely be considered inappropriate for a 
former Member of Parliament (MP) or prominent member of a political party to be 
appointed a judge.  
Concerns about politicisation go beyond party politics, but it is here that drawing clear 
lines about what is and is not permissible becomes difficult. Judicial appointments will 
always possess some element of politics in its broadest sense. Sir Robin Cooke said 
that appointments by the executive are "inevitably political to a greater or lesser 
degree".32 Gee suggests that:33 
Decisions such as who to appoint as judges and how to appoint them always have 
a 'political' dimension, no matter the jurisdiction under discussion. Because 
appointment processes shape the ability of courts to hold political institutions to 
account – and, in some jurisdictions, their ability to interpret constitutionally 
entrenched limits on legislative institutions – it could hardly be otherwise. 
Palmer explained the factors he sought when appointing judges as including "forward-
looking people of high intellectual ability, equipped with ample legal learning, 
experienced, practical, and able to bring essential human qualities to the administration 
of the law".34 He recognised that some people might consider these factors to be 
political.35 Jack Straw, who was responsible for many judicial appointments in the 
  
31  Kate Malleson "The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in 
New Bottles" in Kate Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial 
Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 
39 at 41.  
32  Robin Cooke "Empowerment and Accountability: The Quest for Administrative Justice" (1992) 18 
CLB 1326 at 1331.  
33  Graham Gee "The Politics of Judicial Appointments in Canada" in Judicial Appointments: 
Balancing Independence, Accountability and Legitimacy (Judicial Appointments Commission, 
2010) 99 at 99. 
34  Geoffrey Palmer Reform (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 302. 
35  Palmer, above n 34, at 302. 
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United Kingdom, expressed a similar view.36 Thus some factors which could be 
broadly considered to be political matters will inevitably factor into judicial 
appointments. It is impossible, and moreover undesirable, to attempt to remove 
consideration of these matters from the appointments process.  
In contrast, an inappropriately political decision would be an appointment based on a 
judge's personal views on specific issues that may arise before the courts, or 
anticipation of how a judge would decide a particular case. Drawing on an example 
from the United States, the "litmus test" allegedly adopted to check a candidate's 
position on abortion is an example of an inappropriately political enquiry into how a 
judge would decide a particular issue. 
There is a further need to avoid candidates who are driven by ideology. The decision-
maker's general sense about the extent that the judge will defer to Parliament on social 
and economic questions is broadly political, but also likely arises in the context of 
assessing the quality of his or her previous judgments. It is unrealistic to suggest that a 
factor as general as this could be removed from consideration, especially when 
vigorous analysis of previous judgments is important when considering judicial 
elevations.  
What must be avoided, however, are appointments based on a demonstrated track 
record of ideologically driven decisions. This record could be one of an unduly black 
letter and conservative approach to interpretation, systematic opposition to striking 
down laws in favour of extreme deference to Parliament, or a record of excessive 
activism and eagerness to find grounds on which laws can be struck down. A 
candidate's record may be shown through their judgments or, in the case of new 
appointments to the bench, their conduct and writing while in practice.37  
  
36  See Jack Straw Aspects of Law Reform: An Insider's Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2013) at 57. 
37  For an example of the latter see Dyson Heydon "Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of 
Law" (2003) 47 Quadrant 9, the text of a speech that was later referred to as Heydon's "job 
application" because he was appointed shortly after its delivery to the High Court of Australia. For 
further discussion of this see David Williams "The Judicial Appointment Process" [2004] NZ L 
Rev 39 at 62. 
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In summary, a politicised appointment is one that takes into account party politics and 
a candidate's position on political issues. More broadly, it is a decision which is made 
in anticipation of how the judge would decide particular cases before them. The system 
of appointments must guard against the government's ability to stack a court with 
ideologically driven candidates.  
III Present System of Judicial Appointments 
At present it is the Attorney-General, a member of the executive, who is responsible 
for making judicial appointments. This part explains the process by which judicial 
appointments are made and explores the strengths and weaknesses of this system.  
A Greater Standardisation 
Before the 1990s, New Zealand's appointments process was frequently criticised for its 
lack of transparency. Described as "a highly discreet search process",38 it was 
"shrouded in secrecy and mystery".39 There were no published criteria for judicial 
office, expressions of interest were not called for, vacancies were not advertised, no 
interviews of candidates occurred and consultation processes were ad hoc.40  
Some members of the legal profession supported this highly secretive system. From 
this perspective, the position's prestige required that the office should seek out the best 
occupants, rather than would-be occupants seeking judicial office.41 Advertising and 
calling for applications was seen to "diminish the status of the office and thus its 
attraction as the pinnacle of a legal career".42 This claim simply enhances the 
perception that judicial appointments are insular and based on shoulder-tapping and, 
thankfully, this view has not prevailed. 
Thus the appointments process has improved over time. Greater standardisation 
occurred following a 1999 review; since then the process has featured criteria for 
appointment, a clarified consultation process and a system of calling for expressions of 
  
38  John McGrath "Appointing the Judiciary" [1998] NZLJ 314 at 316. 
39  Joseph, above n 28, at 66. 
40  Joseph, above n 28, at 68. 
41  See McGrath, above n 38, at 316 for a discussion and critique of this perspective. 
42  McGrath, above n 38, at 316. 
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interest.43 The following section explains in more detail how judicial appointments are 
presently made. 
B Judicial Appointments Today 
Very few statutory provisions regulate judicial appointments. The Judicature Act 1908 
provides that "Judges of the High Court shall be appointed by the Governor-General in 
the name and on behalf of her Majesty".44 Judges must have held a practising 
certificate as a barrister or solicitor for at least seven years,45 although most have had 
at least 15–20 years of legal experience before their appointment.46 Shortlisted 
candidates must undertake not to resume legal practice upon retiring as a judge.47 
While it is the Governor-General who appoints judges, it is done on the advice of the 
Attorney-General. Although the process adopted by a particular Attorney-General is 
prescribed neither by statute nor by regulation, successive Attorneys have adopted a 
broadly similar process.48 In 2013 Attorney-General Christopher Finlayson published a 
protocol setting out procedures and criteria for High Court appointments.49 Details of 
this process are described below. 
Prospective candidates may submit an expression of interest form, which are called for 
by public advertisement, or they may be nominated during the consultation process 
and invited to apply. Candidates must provide a curriculum vitae and a declaration on 
issues like their health and financial position.50 The Judicial Appointments Unit, part 
  
43  Patrick McCabe "Appointing Judges" [2004] NZ L Rev 244 at 244.  
44  Judicature Act 1908, s 4(2).  
45  Judicature Act 1908, s 6. Also see District Courts Act 1947, s 5(3).   
46  Ministry of Justice Appointing Judges: A Judicial Appointments Commission for New Zealand? 
(Government Printer, Wellington, 2004) at 13.  
47  Joseph, above n 28, at 69. 
48  Allan, above n 10, at 105. 
49  See Ministry of Justice High Court judges appointment protocol (26 April 2013). Other former 
Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General have summarised the processes adopted while they were 
in office. See, from former Attorneys-General: Palmer, above n 8, at 41–52; East, above n 9, at 
189–190; and Margaret Wilson "Appointing Judges the New Zealand Way" (2014) 21 Waikato 
Law Review 41 at 46–47. See, from former Solicitors-General: McGrath, above n 38, at 314–315; 
and Terrence Arnold "Judicial Appointments" (Speech to the New Zealand Bar Association 
Conference, Wellington, August 2003) at 2–3.  
50  Ministry of Justice, above n 49, at Appendix 2. 
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of the Ministry of Justice, provides administrative assistance throughout the process 
and holds a confidential database containing the names of those who have expressed 
interest and are qualified for appointment.51 
The Solicitor-General seeks comment on the candidates from a range of people and 
organisations. He asks the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal, and the 
Chief High Court Judge to give all prospective candidates a rating.52 The outcome of 
this is to create a long-list containing those considered suitable for immediate 
appointment, those possibly suitable in two to three years, and those in neither 
category.53 This long-list, and the advice received during consultation, is presented to 
the Attorney-General.  
For an upcoming vacancy the Attorney-General, after completing the consultation he 
or she believes necessary, and with the agreement of the Chief Justice, will determine a 
shortlist of no more than three names.54 Interviews conducted by the Attorney-General 
or Solicitor-General may occur. The Attorney-General will select one candidate from 
the shortlist, mention the appointment in Cabinet, and formally advise the Governor-
General to make the appointment.55 The shortlisting process is repeated for each 
upcoming High Court vacancy or appointment. 
District Court appointments follow a similar process. The most significant difference 
from the High Court appointments system is that a panel conducts interviews of 
shortlisted candidates.56 This panel consults with the Solicitor-General and the 
President of the Law Society before making its recommendation to the Attorney-
General.57 Court of Appeal and Supreme Court appointments typically occur through 
judicial promotion. Again there is little direction from legislation. Although 
  
51  Joseph, above n 28, at 68. 
52  Ministry of Justice, above n 49.  
53  The Solicitor-General confers annually with the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal, 
the Chief High Court Judge, and the presidents of the Law Society and Bar Association, to ensure 
the long-list remains current. 
54  Ministry of Justice, above n 49, at Appendix 2.  
55  See ss 4(2) and 57(2) of the Judicature Act 1908 and s 17 of the Supreme Court Act 2003. 
56  Arnold, above n 49, at 3. The panel comprises the Chief District Court Judge, the relevant Head of 
Bench (for appointments to the Family, Youth, Environment or Employment Court), the Executive 
Judge for the region and a representative of the Ministry of Justice. 
57  Joseph, above n 28, at 70.  
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appointment directly from the profession is permitted for both courts,58 this rarely 
occurs for Court of Appeal appointments and has never occurred for the Supreme 
Court.59  
There are two main exceptions to the process outlined above. The Minister of Māori 
Affairs recommends the appointment of judges to the Māori Land Court.60 The Prime 
Minister recommends the appointment of the Chief Justice, as the Chief Justice is head 
of the judiciary61 and Administrator of the Government when the Governor-General is 
overseas or unable to perform the office.62 The Law Commission recently expressed 
approval of this exception,63 and the Prime Minister's role is to be codified.64  
C Advantages and Disadvantages 
This section outlines the advantages of the system and points out its main weaknesses. 
The primary disadvantages of the present system are the lack of transparency and the 
few formal checks and balances that limit the Attorney-General's exercise of 
discretion. Particular attention is therefore paid to how the system safeguards the 
political neutrality of appointments.  
A key feature of the present appointments process is the widespread consultation that 
occurs.65 This consultation seeks to gather a diverse group of candidates and 
  
58  Judicature Act 1908, s 57; and Supreme Court Act 2003, s 20. 
59  Joseph, above n 28, at 69. 
60  See Te Ture Whenua Māori Act (Māori Land Act) 1993, s 7(2A), which requires that Māori land 
court judges have knowledge of te reo Māori, tikanga Māori and the Treaty of Waitangi. 
61  Supreme Court Act 2003, s 18(1).  
62  Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor-General of New Zealand 2006, cl 12. 
63   Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 
2012) at Recommendation 13, also see [5.11].  
64  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2), cl 100. 
65  Those consulted include "the Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief High 
Court Judge, the Secretary for Justice, the president of the Law Commission, the president of the 
New Zealand Bar Association, the president of the New Zealand Law Society and other 
organisations or groups representative of lawyers who the Attorney-General believes can contribute 
names of suitable persons. Such groups may include the Criminal Bar Association, the Māori Law 
Society, and women lawyers' associations. Nominations are sought from the Minister of Justice, the 
Minister of Women's Affairs and the Minister of Māori Affairs. Nominations may also be sought 
from the chair of the justice and electoral select committee and the opposition spokesperson for the 
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particularly to find individuals whose career and background are not reflected in the 
present judiciary.66 Further consultation with a smaller group occurs when comment is 
sought on prospective candidates by the Solicitor-General.67 In a recently emerging 
practice, the opposition shadow Attorney-General is also consulted when the initial 
long-list is created, a "symbolic endorsement of the apolitical nature of 
appointments".68 However, the protocol produced by Finlayson suggests that the 
shadow Attorney-General "may" be consulted when nominations are sought, 
suggesting that this practice is not firmly established.69 
An important aspect of the consultation process is the high level of judicial 
involvement. The most recent protocol outlined by Finlayson suggests that the Chief 
Justice has a veto, because the shortlist of no more than three candidates is created 
"with the agreement of the Chief Justice".70 However, there has been criticism of 
processes that give judges too much power over appointments, especially if that power 
amounts to a veto.71 A judicial veto is not a firmly established rule; former Solicitor-
General Sir John McGrath for example said that the judiciary's input does not tightly 
restrict who may be chosen, and its role is consultative.72 This inconsistency highlights 
one of the drawbacks of the present process; it is not grounded in statute so its 
operation is ad hoc and lacking in transparency, notwithstanding efforts over the years 
to standardise the process.  
The high level of judicial influence is counterbalanced by the Attorney-General having 
the final say over appointments. This has two benefits. First, giving the Attorney-
General discretion is appropriate because he or she has the democratic mandate as a 
                                                                                                                                        
Attorney-General portfolio": Ministry of Justice, above n 49. Also see McGrath, above n 38, at 314 
and Arnold, above n 49, at 3. 
66  See East, above n 9, at 191; and McGrath, above n 38, at 314.  
67  Ministry of Justice, above n 49. Here, the Solicitor-General seeks comments from the Chief Justice, 
the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief High Court Judge, the New Zealand Law Society, 
the New Zealand Bar Association, and others as appropriate.  
68  Joseph, above n 28, at 68. 
69  Ministry of Justice, above n 49. 
70  Ministry of Justice, above n 49. 
71  See for example, Palmer, above n 8, at 43.  
72  McGrath, above n 38, at 316. But see Allan, above n 10, at 105, where it is suggested that senior 
judges may have an informal veto if they are dead set against someone. 
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member of a government that enjoys Parliament's support.73 Secondly, giving 
discretion to the Attorney-General has encouraged the appointment of lawyers with 
less orthodox backgrounds.74 
The principal disadvantage of this system is the lack of formal safeguards to limit the 
Attorney-General's exercise of discretion and, in particular, his or her ability to make 
politicised appointments. Two main bulwarks protect judicial independence in 
appointments: first, the conventions that govern the Attorney-General's decision-
making, and second, the fact that political pressures hold the Attorney-General 
accountable. The strength of these protections is considered in the next section. The 
arguments here are not made on the basis of criticism of recent judicial appointments 
in New Zealand, but rather from the concern that future appointments may be at risk of 
improper political influence.  
1 Strength of the Constitutional Convention 
The first bulwark against political appointments is the convention that the Attorney-
General makes appointments based on merit. As Senior Law Officer, the Attorney-
General is required by convention to make appointments independently of party 
political considerations.75 The Attorney-General is "guardian of the public interest and 
exercises an independent function not shared by other ministers".76 This is reflected in 
the convention that appointments are announced, but not discussed or approved, in 
Cabinet. 
McGrath contends that the strength of this convention is often under-estimated and 
that holders of offices governed by conventional duties have a strong sense of 
obligation not to fail in those responsibilities.77 Arnold expressed similar sentiments, 
saying "[t]hese conventions are robust, essentially as a result of the scrupulous way in 
which they have been understood and observed by the relevant actors over many 
years".78 Thus although an Attorney-General could foreseeably breach convention and 
  
73  McGrath, above n 38, at 316. 
74  McGrath, above n 38, at 316.  
75  Ministry of Justice, above n 46, at [29]. 
76  Joseph, above n 28, at 67. 
77  McGrath, above n 38, at 317. Also see Palmer, above n 8, at 44. 
78  Arnold, above n 49, at 7. 
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make appointments based on political considerations, McGrath reminds us that "this 
can be said of many of our offices that are restrained by constitutional conventions".79  
However, the operation of this convention cannot be equated with the operation of all 
others. While it is true that all conventions are, by their very nature, at risk of being 
ignored, not all conventions operate in a like manner or are at equal risk of being 
breached.  
The operation and strength of many conventions can be verified by the public. For 
example, the public would know if the Governor-General breached convention by 
refusing to assent to legislation or by acting contrary to a Minister's advice; an 
appropriate response to the breach could therefore occur. Conversely, while some may 
question an appointment, only the Attorney-General can know whether the 
appointment was driven by improper considerations.  
Therefore, the convention preventing political appointments is quite unlike other 
conventions that restrain the exercise of certain public offices. The public must rely on 
the integrity and assurances of "insiders" to know whether the convention is strong. 
Unsurprisingly, this provides a lesser sense of certainty about the reliability of the 
process. McCormick, speaking of the situation in Canada where a very similar 
appointments process was adopted, summarised the problem:80 
It may well be that the right people are involved, that they are making their 
decisions on defensible criteria, and that their advice is strictly followed by the 
politicians, with purely professional considerations always being preemptive – but 
since we do not know that this is the case, we have to take it on faith, and this 
phrase is the very antithesis of transparency. 
The fact that several Attorneys-General and Solicitors-General have confirmed that 
appointments occur independently of political considerations increases confidence in 
the process. However, doubts are always likely to linger in any system that gives wide 
discretion to a government minister, especially in a society which is increasingly 
  
79  McGrath, above n 38, at 317.  
80  McCormick, above n 29, at 24–25. 
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willing to question authority figures and demand greater transparency.81 Perceptions of 
bias will arise, regardless of how impartial appointments are in practice, simply by 
virtue of the fact that appointments are made by a government minister without public 
oversight.82 
2 Political Accountability 
In addition to the convention against political appointments, a second bulwark exists. 
As the Attorney-General is a minister, appointments can be subjected to the political 
accountability that corresponds with that role. This form of protection has two 
components. First, accountability to Parliament, and therefore the public, affects the 
conscience of the Attorney-General and "brings home to [him or her] … the need to 
make appointments on merit".83 
The second component is that the Attorney-General may be questioned and held to 
account for his or her choices, including through Select Committee examination.84 
Allan drew on the 2004 appointments to the new Supreme Court as evidence of this 
protection. He contended that, notwithstanding the absence of legal limits, political 
limits constrained the Attorney-General's exercise of discretion when appointing four 
members of the new Supreme Court.85 He argued that political pressures led the 
Attorney-General to elevate the four most senior members of the Court of Appeal.86 
However, these political limitations are less effective under ordinary circumstances 
when a single judge is appointed. As the process operates with little transparency, it 
would be difficult to mobilise political opposition if it was suspected that an 
appointment was made, or a candidate was rejected, on inappropriate grounds. Former 
Chief Justice Sir Thomas Eichelbaum reminds us that "[w]hat remain unknown and 
  
81  For further discussion of this change in public attitudes, see for example Thomas Eichelbaum "The 
Inaugural Neil Williamson Memorial Lecture: Judicial Independence Revisited" (1997) 6 
Canterbury L Rev 421 at 421. 
82  See Jeffrey Jowell "The Growing International Consensus in Favour of Independent Judicial 
Appointment Commissions" in Judicial Appointments: Balancing Independence, Accountability 
and Legitimacy (Judicial Appointments Commission, 2010) 1 at 3. 
83  McGrath, above n 38, at 316 
84  Palmer, above n 8, at 42. 
85  Allan, above n 10, at 106–107. 
86  Allan, above n 10, at 107. 
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unseen are the cases where for politically influenced reasons, particular persons are not 
appointed".87 Thus the protection afforded by political accountability is fairly weak 
given that appointments occur in the absence of open and transparent procedures. 
Another element to the Supreme Court appointments episode calls these safeguards 
into question. Then Attorney-General Margaret Wilson, while discussing the 
appointments to the new Supreme Court and whether they were to be solely based on 
seniority, has said:88  
This was the only time I can say there was any discussion in Cabinet of judicial 
appointments. I had suggested an appointment panel but this did not gain support. 
Unfortunately one of my ministerial colleagues suggested subsequently that the 
appointments were not made on merit, which created a brief furore and convinced 
me that the practice of not discussing judicial appointments in Cabinet was a good 
policy. 
It is unclear whether Cabinet discussed the method of judicial appointments generally 
or whether discussion of the actual candidates for appointment occurred. The latter 
possibility is a worrying breach of convention. Although this was an unusual situation 
as the government was under political pressure regarding judicial appointments, 
similar pressures could foreseeably arise again. The fact that an important convention 
governing appointments is perhaps weaker than is generally claimed is a cause for 
concern. Eichelbaum has said that it is not easy for modern Attorneys-General, when 
fulfilling their traditionally independent role in relation to the judiciary, to distance 
themselves from their Cabinet colleagues and collective Cabinet responsibility.89 
The primary disadvantages of the present system of appointments are its lack of 
transparency and the fact that the Attorney-General exercises a wide degree of 
discretion, with little beyond his or her integrity to safeguard the non-political nature 
of appointments. The next part examines Canada's experience after its Charter was 
adopted, to help assess whether New Zealand's present appointments system should be 
retained if a supreme law BORA was enacted. 
  
87  Eichelbaum, above n 81, at 427.  
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IV Is The Present System Suitable? Canada's Experience 
This part uses Canada as a case study in how enacting a supreme law instrument 
affects judicial independence and judicial appointments. Canada did not address the 
collateral issue of judicial appointments when its Charter was enacted. Post-Charter, 
appointments came under far greater scrutiny and the existing appointments system 
was widely criticised, but lasting and substantial reform has not been forthcoming.  
A Why Canada? 
Because of its similarities with New Zealand and the fact that it moved from an 
instrument similar to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to the Charter, Canada 
is a useful case study. Like New Zealand, Canada was a colony that imported the 
common law and legal traditions of Britain. Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council ended in 1949.90 A significant difference between New Zealand and 
Canada is Canada's system of provinces and territories. The federal model affects 
judicial appointments; there are both federal and provincial courts, with a hierarchy 
within each category and varied systems of appointment. This paper focuses on 
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), because these appointments 
came under increased scrutiny after the Charter's adoption and were significantly 
reformed as a result. 
The precursor to the Charter was the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, an ordinary federal 
statute with the same status as the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It was 
perceived as ineffective because of the courts' hesitance to use the law forcefully,91 so 
in 1982 the Charter, a comprehensive bill of rights with supreme law status, was 
enacted. 
Although the courts may strike down laws that are inconsistent with the protected 
rights, the Charter makes several concessions to parliamentary sovereignty. Like s 5 of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 1 of the Charter provides that the rights 
  
90  See McCormick, above n 29, at 8–9 for further background on this reform.  
91  Munroe Eagles and Sharon A Manna "Politics and Government" in Patrick James and Mark Kasoff 
(eds) Canadian Studies in the New Millennium (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2008) 65 at 
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and freedoms are "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". The "Notwithstanding 
Clause" allows provincial and federal legislatures to approve the application of a law 
notwithstanding a judicial finding that it breaches the Charter,92 but is rarely used.93 
At the time the Charter was enacted, SCC appointments occurred in a manner very 
similar to New Zealand's present system. Appointments were made by the Governor-
General who, in accordance with convention, was advised by the Prime Minister for 
appointment of the Chief Justice and by the Minister of Justice, likely with the Prime 
Minister's input, for other SCC appointments.94 As in New Zealand, this process was 
characterised by widespread consultation with members of the bench and bar.95 
Although appointments before 1970 were frequently based on political connections,96 
a major change in focus meant that appointments since that time were driven largely 
by competence rather than patronage.97 However, research reveals no reference to 
constitutional conventions governing the non-political nature of appointments, thus the 
protection of this value appears weaker than in New Zealand. 
B Public Perception of Judicial Appointments 
This section outlines the public's response to the judiciary's ability to make policy-
laden decisions, in particular highlighting several worrying cases where civil society 
groups attempted to lobby decision-makers on appointments. This illustrates the 
  
92  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to 
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additional pressure and scrutiny placed on the judicial appointments system in the 
post-Charter environment. 
1 Public Opinion 
Public perceptions of the judiciary and judicial appointments have been affected by the 
Charter. A 2002 poll indicated that two thirds of the public supported popular election 
of SCC judges.98 Although there is no equivalent polling from before the Charter's 
adoption, this number is surprisingly high and likely reflects Canadians' increased 
awareness of judges' policy-making function.99 Another 2003 poll found that 
Canadians were concerned by the increased powers of judges, finding that 71 per cent 
of Canadians agreed that "it should be up to Parliament and provincial legislatures, not 
the courts, to make laws in Canada".100 
2 Lobbying 
Recognising the increased power of judges, many civil society groups have responded 
by seeking to influence judicial appointments. The National Action Committee on the 
Status of Women began in 1981 to lobby for the appointment of a woman "acceptable 
to [their] purposes" on the SCC.101 Their later "influencing the influencers" campaign 
aimed to influence judicial appointments and judges' ongoing professional 
education.102 A prominent judgment concerning abortion prompted a member of 
Choose Life Canada to say that her group would attempt to influence future 
appointments.103 The President of an opposing organisation responded that, while her 
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99  FL Morton "Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter Canada: A System in Transition" in Kate 
Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 56 at 56. 
100  Morton, above n 99, at 56. 
101  Justice Committee "NAC Memo" (September 1981) at 5; Justice Committee "NAC Memo" (March 
1981) at 4, as cited in Morton, above n 99, at 60.  
102  Morton, above n 99, at 61. 
103  "Public to demand say in Court Appointments" Lawyers Weekly (12 February 1988) at 1, as cited 
in Morton, above n 99, at 61. 
25  
 
group had never tried to influence appointments previously, it would if necessary in 
the future.104 
The obvious follow-up question is whether this lobbying has actually worked; have 
interest groups had inappropriate influence, or are these statements empty words?  
The first response is that there is some evidence that lobbying efforts have been 
successful, but there are other instances of unsuccessful lobbying. An example of the 
latter was a feminist organisation's failed efforts to have Mary Eberts appointed to the 
SCC, despite a campaign that included phone calls, letters and personal representations 
to the Prime Minister's Office and Cabinet ministers.105 In contrast, the lobbying effort 
of ÉGALE, a prominent gay rights advocacy group, appears to have been successful. 
In 1997 the group lobbied members of the Government about a SCC appointment; 
remarkably, members of ÉGALE were even given the Government's shortlist of 
candidates.106 The judge appointed, Michèle Bastarache, joined the majority shortly 
after his appointment in Vriend v Alberta, a major victory for gay rights groups.107 
The second and better response to this question is that whether or not lobbying is 
successful is not the problem. Instead, the perception that lobbying has occurred and 
might influence appointments is concerning. In the previous example, Bastarache's 
appointment may have been wholly non-political and he may be well qualified for the 
role, yet the secretive nature of appointments means the public cannot be certain and 
must take that on faith. Consequently, questions continue to linger about the place of 
politics in the decision, which has a de-legitimising effect regardless of whether the 
decision was in fact based on political factors.  
Lobbying was not restricted to civil society groups; Canadian MPs have similarly 
stated the importance of influencing appointments. MP James Jepson said that "[w]e 
now have a chance to put men and women on the bench with a more conservative 
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point of view".108  Although at the time his comments represented a "sharp break" 
from Canadian practice, in retrospect "they marked the beginning of a growing 
demand for greater transparency and public participation in Supreme Court 
appointments".109  
C Reform of Judicial Appointments 
The SCC appointment system has undergone significant reform over the past decade. 
Although questions have been raised about the political neutrality of some 
appointments, as discussed above, concern about existing examples of patronage was 
not the main trigger for reform; instead it was the judiciary's increased power 
compared to the legislature and concern about the lack of transparency that drove 
reform.110 Criticising a "democratic deficit" in Canada due partly to the system of 
appointing judges, Prime Minister Paul Martin charged the House of Commons Justice 
Committee with suggesting more transparent alternatives.111 Its recommendations were 
the creation of an appointments commission and legislative scrutiny of prospective 
appointees.112 Attempts to implement these recommendations are assessed below. 
1 Early Reforms 
In 2004 the Minister of Justice announced that two SCC nominees would be subject to 
a parliamentary review. Despite lofty goals, the reality was disappointing. The review 
occurred in a single session held one day after the announcement, very few MPs were 
involved, and the panel had no power to delay or veto the nomination.113  The panel 
questioned neither the candidates themselves nor the Prime Minister who selected 
them; instead, questions were directed only at the Minister of Justice, who stated 
explicitly that it had not been his decision.114 One journalist likened this as akin to 
"sending your mother to do your job interview".115 
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Given the derision that greeted the previous attempt to add greater transparency to the 
process, a new approach involving an advisory committee was announced in 2005.116 
What at first appeared to be a significant reform lacked substance. The committee was 
dominated by politicians and federal appointees117 and had a very narrow role. After 
starting with a list of eight candidates provided by the Department of Justice, its role 
would be cutting the list to three. In-person interviews of candidates would be banned, 
and the committee could not add additional names to the initial eight. A decision 
would ultimately be made by the Prime Minister, who could make an appointment 
from outside the shortlist if he or she considered it necessary. After an appointment, 
the Minister of Justice would appear before the Justice Committee to explain the 
appointment process. 
After this commission created its shortlist, the governing party lost an election. One of 
the policies of the newly elected Conservative Government was a public, 
parliamentary interview process for proposed SCC appointees.118 Thus the new 
Government chose one name from the shortlist created by the former Government's 
advisory committee. Rather than the Minster of Justice appearing before the Justice 
Committee, the new Government had the nominee, Marshall Rothstein, appear. 
2 Legislative Hearings  
Over a three hour televised session Rothstein was questioned by 12 MPs, representing 
the various political parties. A constitutional expert moderated the session and outlined 
the types of questions that were not appropriate, for example, the nominee's position 
on hypothetical cases or why he decided a particular case the way he did.119 While 
some MPs raised controversial topics like abortion and same-sex marriage, the Chair 
told the nominee that he did not have to respond.120 The MPs were "extremely polite 
and deferential", some apologetic that he was even subjected to the review, and far less 
  
116  Ministry of Justice Proposal to Reform the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process (April 
2005). This proposal is explained and critiqued by McCormick, above n 29, at 39–41.   
117  The committee was comprised of one member nominated by each political party recognised in the 
House of Commons, one retired judge, one member nominated by the Attorney-General of the 
relevant province for which the appointment is made, one member nominated by the law society of 
the relevant province, and two lay members nominated by the Minister of Justice. 
118  Hogg, above n 94, at 529.  
119  Hogg, above n 94, at 538. 
120  Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell, above n 95, at 142. 
28  
 
aggressive in their questioning than their American counterparts.121 Committee 
members had no voting power but were invited to submit their views to the Prime 
Minister, who later formally announced Rothstein's appointment.122  
This new process was controversial. Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin opposed the 
hearing, as did various former presidents of the Canadian Bar Association and other 
prominent legal professionals.123  
A different process was adopted in 2008. A committee of five MPs – two from the 
government caucus and one from each opposition party – would privately review a list 
of names put forward by the government and produce a three person shortlist.124 
However, the committee descended into partisan bickering, so the Prime Minister 
simply announced the nomination of Thomas Cromwell following discussions with the 
Leader of the Opposition.125 Although it was intended that the nominee would appear 
before a parliamentary committee, an election intervened and Cromwell was appointed 
without a hearing.126 Thus the appointment was essentially a reversion to the previous 
process. 
After this fiasco, some consistency was achieved.127 Several subsequent appointments 
were made where a committee of MPs reviewed a list of candidates to form a shortlist, 
from which the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice selected who to appoint. The 
composition of these committees was odd: only MPs were involved and in each case a 
majority of members were from the governing party. A legislative hearing with the 
chosen candidate then took place. 
After several years of consistency, appointments returned to a state of flux in 2013, 
following the appointment of Marc Nadon. After being sworn in as a SCC Judge, 
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Nadon's appointment was nullified by the Supreme Court; he was deemed ineligible 
based on legislation which requires that three SCC Judges be from Quebec.128 Further 
problems arose because the shortlist created by the committee of MPs was 
subsequently leaked to the media.129 The appointment of the most recent Justice, 
Clément Gascon, was simply announced by the Prime Minister. This reversion to the 
original appointments process occurred because the Government "no longer trusted" 
the reformed appointments system.130 It is unclear what process will be adopted in 
future.131 
V Reforming Appointments in New Zealand 
Canada's experience – enacting the Charter while initially retaining a judicial 
appointments system similar to New Zealand's – offers several main conclusions. It 
suggests that reform of New Zealand's appointments system is necessary and indicates 
how that reform should proceed. 
A Reform is Needed  
Canada's experience shows that enacting a supreme law BORA is likely to expose 
New Zealand's judicial appointments system to far greater scrutiny, and it seems 
unlikely to be able to withstand the additional pressure inevitably placed upon it. 
Canada enacted a supreme law instrument but did not concurrently address the 
collateral consequences of this reform; it "never really worked through the 
implications of wedding … an American-style interventionist court with a traditionally 
English style of appointing judges".132  
  
128  In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning sections 5 and 6 of the 
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 2013-1105 dated 
October 22, 2013  [2014] 1 SCR 433.  
129  See Sean Fine "The secret short list that provoked the rift between Chief Justice and PMO" Globe 
and Mail (online ed, May 23 2013).  
130  Sean Fine "Legal observers worry future judicial appointments will be done in secret" Globe and 
Mail (online ed, 18 September 2014). Also see Kim Mackrael and Sean Fine "Tories changed tack 
on Supreme Court appointments after Globe report" Globe and Mail (online ed, 16 September 
2014). 
131  Fine, above n 130.  
132  McCormick, above n 29, at 17, referring to Morton, above n 99. 
30  
 
The principal disadvantage of the previous Canadian approach was the wide discretion 
exercised through a secretive process by members of the government, with little 
beyond their integrity to safeguard the non-political nature of appointments. The ease 
with which the system could be criticised meant that, following high-profile Charter 
cases, the media and politicians increasingly questioned how appointments were 
made.133 Judicial appointments also became a prominent political issue; for example, 
parties campaigned on policies regarding judicial appointments,134 and a sub-theme of 
the 2004 federal general election campaign was a concern about the kind of judicial 
appointments that a new conservative Prime Minister might make.135 
The system's fragility was exposed. Thus over time, almost every major Canadian 
newspaper noted the growing political influence of Canada's judges and criticised the 
nature of their appointment.136 This led to increased agreement that improvements 
were needed, hence the attempts at reform. 
Canada's experience suggests that if New Zealand enacts a supreme law BORA, the 
judicial appointments system will similarly be subject to significantly more scrutiny. It 
has not been immune to criticism notwithstanding the absence of a supreme law 
BORA; a former Chief Justice, former President of the Court of Appeal and former 
Attorney-General have, among others, all called for reform.137 As occurred in Canada, 
these calls are only likely to grow louder once judges have the power to strike down 
legislation. 
New Zealand's present appointments process shares the same fundamental weaknesses 
as the previous Canadian system. The non-political nature of appointments is 
predominantly safeguarded by the integrity of a member of the executive rather than 
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by formal checks and balances. Too much power is concentrated in the hands of one 
individual, especially since the power to shape the courts' composition would be more 
potent than ever if judges were capable of striking down legislation. The appointments 
process lacks transparency and is closed and exclusive; it "makes no effort to elicit the 
support for appointments of members of the legislature whose laws the appointee will 
eventually review".138 Thus the present system of appointments is insufficiently robust 
to withstand the scrutiny that will inevitably be placed upon it should a supreme law 
BORA be enacted. Reform of the judicial appointments process should occur. 
B Character of the Necessary Reform 
New Zealand should learn from Canada's experience, which is largely an example of 
what not to do when reforming judicial appointments. Four conclusions can be drawn 
from the Canadian case study: reform must be proactive, codified, bipartisan and 
responsive.  
1 Proactive  
First, reform of judicial appointments must be proactive. New Zealand should consider 
changing how judges are appointed prior to, or alongside, a decision to enact a 
supreme law BORA.  
There is a contrary argument that a supreme law BORA should be enacted without 
addressing collateral issues like judicial appointments. On this view, it is unnecessary 
to pre-empt the effects of such reform and prematurely respond to problems that may 
not eventuate. Issues can be addressed at a later date if and when they do arise. This 
argument – the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" approach to law reform – intuitively 
makes a lot of sense. 
However, Canada's experience shows why this approach is problematic. Despite 
recognition of the need for improvement, in Canada there was little agreement on the 
appropriate reform. Although adjustments have been made since 2004, these have 
varied widely; some appointments have involved a screening or appointments 
commission (of differing compositions – most recently made solely of MPs, the 
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majority of which were from the governing party), others have included legislative 
hearings, and others have been made by reverting to the previous system.139 
Why has achieving lasting change been so difficult in Canada? Commentators see the 
government's vested interest in retaining control over appointments as a major 
inhibitor to substantive reform. The government's main concern, it is suggested, is with 
superficial appearances rather than genuine improvement.140 
Failing to address wider issues like judicial appointments before enacting a supreme 
law BORA risks creating a political context in which achieving genuine reform 
becomes increasingly difficult. To avoid this, proactive reform which addresses 
collateral issues like judicial appointments alongside the decision to adopt a supreme 
law BORA is desirable. A similar argument is often advanced in favour of enacting a 
supreme law BORA itself; even in the absence of rights infringements in the past "[i]t 
is much better not to wait for a flood before we build the dam. The planning and 
building should take account of the threat by careful thought and execution in 
advance".141 
Furthermore, Paul East suggested that a judicial appointments commission, once 
created, would be politically impossible to disband.142 This scenario illustrates the 
desirability of a measured approach to reform over a knee-jerk response to pressures 
placed on the system. 
2 Codified 
The second conclusion is that reform must be codified. The changes in Canada were 
not; instead the process to be adopted was simply announced by the Minister of Justice 
when a vacancy arose.143 The series of fluctuating and inconsistent methods of 
appointment adopted in Canada undermine the aims of increasing transparency and 
public confidence in appointments. Codifying reform would ensure greater consistency 
in the way judges are appointed. 
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3 Bipartisan 
Thirdly, any reform must be bipartisan. That was not the case in Canada; as outlined 
above, the varying systems of appointment have taken place under two governments 
and the method of appointing judges became a political issue. Appointments are 
currently in a state of flux and it is not clear that a new government would retain the 
system implemented by the present government. This is a worrying state of affairs for 
an issue of constitutional importance. A bipartisan approach to reform would go some 
way towards insulating appointments from political attacks and ensuring consistency 
in the method of appointment. 
4 Responsive 
The fourth conclusion is that reform of appointments must actually respond to the 
problem. Canada failed to precisely define the present problem and respond 
substantively to it. Consequently, the value of its reforms is limited. 
The legislative hearing process did little to limit the Prime Minister's exercise of 
discretion. While the Prime Minister contended that the hearing process "brought 
unprecedented openness and accountability to the process",144 this is undoubtedly an 
overstatement considering that many questions were off limits and the hearings did not 
offer reasons why one candidate was chosen over another qualified individual. 
Furthermore, many of the questions asked at the various hearings were inane and gave 
MPs little information of value in determining whether the appointee was qualified.145 
The MPs had no voting power and the nomination could have proceeded even if they 
had expressed disapproval of the nominee. Therefore the reform appears to be little 
more than rubber stamping of nominees; it creates a public process but does not truly 
create a check on the Prime Minister's exercise of discretion. 
The more recent involvement of a committee of Canadian MPs is also of questionable 
value. The composition of these committees was odd; in each case the governing 
party's MPs constituted a majority on the committee and non-political actors like 
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judges or law society representatives were excluded. The dominance of government 
MPs, and the absence of independent non-political actors, means that the committee 
cannot be considered an impartial body independent of government. Members of the 
Government could simply tell the members of their caucus on the committee to ensure 
that certain candidates make the shortlist. 
Thus the problem with this reform is that it does not act as an effective and 
independent check on the Prime Minister's exercise of discretion. The value of the 
legislative hearing was instead to allow MPs and the public to get to know the 
appointee and to hear their views on, for example, their role as judges or their 
understanding of Charter rights. The hearing, Hogg contended, sent a reassuring 
message about the nominee's abilities and integrity.146 He also saw the hearing as a 
useful antidote to charges of judicial activism that frequently arise following unpopular 
decisions.147 
While these are undoubtedly positive consequences, they do not address one of the 
main problems with the present system: the lack of checks on the executive's 
responsibility for judicial appointments. There was a failure to define the precise 
nature of the problem and respond accordingly, meaning the reforms enacted in 
Canada are more superficial than substantive. Therefore the next section defines the 
present problem and determines what reform of appointments is really trying to 
achieve, creating a framework within which possible reforms can be assessed. 
C The Purpose of Reform 
To enact responsive and lasting reform, it is necessary to identify precisely what the 
reform aims to achieve. McGrath summarised the values to be applied in the 
appointment process as political neutrality, adherence to merit based criteria, 
maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and accountability for appointments.148  
The first value identified – political neutrality – is of central importance in a system 
with a supreme law BORA. There are twin goals. The first is to enhance the political 
neutrality of appointments and prevent the government from being able to stack a court 
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with ideologically driven candidates. The second aspect is to quell the perception that 
ideological appointments could occur. Even if appointments are politically neutral in 
fact, unless they are perceived to be so the door is open to political sensations and 
attacks in response to appointments or following unpopular judgments. As discussed 
above, part of a Canadian federal election campaign concerned the sorts of 
conservative judicial appointments that a new government might make.149 As these 
sorts of attacks have a corrosive effect on public confidence in the judiciary's 
independence, the appointments system should aim to reduce the risk that they would 
occur. 
However, political neutrality is not the only goal; reform should not aim solely to 
enhance neutrality at the expense of other values. McGrath emphasises adherence to 
merit based criteria. Undoubtedly, appointments must be based on merit, not irrelevant 
political considerations, but merit cannot mean legal ability alone. The appointments 
system should also foster the appointment of individuals with empathy and encourage 
greater diversity among appointees. These characteristics, while important in any 
group of judges, are of heightened importance when judges have the ability to strike 
down laws and make what are in effect political decisions. Jeffrey Jowell suggests that 
"qualities such as social sensitivity or political sagacity" are needed if a supreme law 
BORA is enacted.150 
To Beverly McLachlin, former Chief Justice of Canada, it is particularly important that 
judges possess the following qualities in the post-Charter environment:151 
…they must remain in touch with the world about them if they are to render 
relevant and helpful decisions. It is also obvious that the composition of the courts 
should reflect insofar as possible the broad mosaic of our society, the better to 
guard against the predominance of uniform insularity.  
McGrath also notes that public confidence in the judiciary must be protected. In 
addition to maintaining confidence in the judiciary's independence, the appointments 
system should foster the democratic legitimacy of judges. While necessary in any 
system, democratic legitimacy is of heightened importance once a supreme law BORA 
  
149  McCormick, above n 29, at 27. 
150  Jowell, above n 82, at 3.  
151  McLachlan, above n 16, at 543. 
36  
 
is enacted because the reduction of Parliament's power compared to the courts may be 
seen as undemocratic. Canada has grappled with a perceived democratic deficit 
following the enactment of the Charter, partly because of its system of appointing 
judges.152 
Accountability for appointments is the fourth value identified by McGrath and is 
linked to the point on public confidence. If judicial appointments are made without 
sufficient input from MPs and the government, weakening the sense of accountability 
to the public, the judiciary risks being perceived as elitist and unqualified to assess the 
political aspects that inform a decision to strike down legislation.   
Other important criteria include that the process should protect confidentiality, to 
avoid the risk that good candidates will be deterred from seeking judicial office.  
Unnecessary expense or administrative burdens should be avoided. The system of 
appointments must also accord with New Zealand's common law tradition and political 
culture. 
Thus a key goal of reform is to create a system where judicial appointments are 
perceived to be, and are in fact, free from the sorts of improperly political 
considerations that were identified above. However, this goal cannot be the sole focus 
at the expense of the other values identified. The following parts explain options for 
reform and assess how the various alternatives perform when assessed against the 
aforementioned criteria. 
VI Options for Reform  
A The Judicature Modernisation Bill 
The Judicature Modernisation Bill, presently before Parliament, arose following a 
report by the Law Commission. For judicial appointments the Commission endorsed 
the status quo system but made recommendations designed to increase its transparency 
and ensure consistency in its application.153 Several of these recommendations were 
not included in the subsequent Judicature Modernisation Bill, but with little 
explanation for their omission. It is suggested here that the Commission's 
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recommendations are valuable but that they are insufficient alone to respond to the 
issues raised in this paper. 
1 Law Commission Recommendations  
One recommendation that was accepted by the Government would require the 
Attorney-General to publish the process he or she would follow in soliciting and 
advancing nominations for judicial appointment.154 A second recommendation 
concerned the consultation of interested parties when appointing judges. The 
Commission recommended the following:155 
Before making an appointment, whether "first instance" or an elevation to a 
higher court, the Attorney-General should be required by statute to consult: 
o the Chief Justice, in the case of an appointment to the Higher Courts, and the 
Chief District Court Judge, in the case of appointment to the District Courts; 
o the Head of Bench of the court to which the appointment will be made; 
o the Solicitor-General; 
o the President of the New Zealand Law Society; 
o the President of the New Zealand Bar Association; and 
o such other persons as he or she considers to be appropriate. 
Notably, this recommendation includes the words "whether 'first instance' or an 
elevation to a higher court". Their inclusion accords with the view of many submitters 
to the Commission, who saw the process of consultation as being of equal, if not 
greater, importance for judicial elevations as for the initial appointment.156 The Law 
Society, for example, said that the profession has "a vital interest" in promotions, and 
"is likely to have information that would be of substantial importance in making 
promotions".157 The Commission was of the view that this would not create an undue 
administrative burden on those involved as relatively few appellate appointments are 
made each year.158  
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It is appropriate that the Commission considered elevations to be equally as important 
as initial appointments. Elevations to higher courts are particularly significant and 
likely to attract the most attention if a supreme law BORA were enacted, given that 
decisions striking down legislation are likely to be appealed to the Supreme Court. The 
quality and political neutrality of appeal court appointments is therefore essential. 
While recognising that no single template is achievable or desirable for New Zealand 
judges, the Commission also suggested some general principles that an Attorney-
General ought to observe in making appointments159 and recommended that criteria for 
appointment be included in statute.160 
2 Inadequacy of the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
The Ministry of Justice, in a document explaining the Judicature Modernisation Bill's 
changes to judicial appointments, accepted that "scope exists to achieve greater clarity 
and transparency in the judicial appointment process, given the limited publicly 
available information".161 Despite this recognition, the Bill is significantly less 
comprehensive than the Commission proposed. The Bill does not require that 
consultation take place and does not include a list of the people to be consulted, and 
nor are criteria for appointment to be codified. Instead, cl 93 of the Bill only sets out a 
requirement for the publication of information concerning the appointment process:162  
93 Attorney-General to publish information concerning judicial appointment process 
The Attorney-General must publish information explaining his or her process for— 
(a) seeking expressions of interest for the appointment of Judges and Associate 
Judges; and 
(b) recommending persons for appointment as a Judge or an Associate Judge. 
 
While this is a welcome change, and reflects one of the Commission's 
recommendations, it falls well short of what was suggested. Yet there has been very 
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little explanation for, or discussion of, these omissions. A response to the 
Commission's Report from the Minister of Justice said:163 
However, I do not support placing relatively detailed appointment criteria and 
consultation in primary legislation, as proposed by the Commission. Instead, after 
consultation with the Attorney-General, I propose a legislative requirement for 
the Attorney-General to produce public guidelines or protocols outlining the 
process to be followed when he or she solicits and advances judicial appointment 
recommendations to the Governor-General 
My approach enables transparency and flexibility, and reinforces the public 
protocol that has already been approved by the Attorney-General for District 
Court judicial appointments. An equivalent protocol is soon to be made available 
for higher courts appointments in line with the proposed statutory requirement.   
The only explanation for this change is suggested by the use of the term "flexibility", 
which accords with the view of some submitters to the Commission that desirable 
flexibility is lost if the criteria for judicial appointment are codified.164 Despite this, the 
majority of submitters to the Commission agreed that there should be statutory 
criteria,165 and submitters almost unanimously agreed with the other significant 
proposal – that consultation with specified individuals should be mandatory and 
formalised in legislation.166 
There is therefore little to explain the change. Nor has clarification been forthcoming 
as the Bill progressed through the House; there has been no discussion or criticism of 
the failure to include the Commission's more comprehensive recommendations. Clause 
93 attracted cross-party support in the First Reading debate167 and was unchanged by 
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the Select Committee.168 It remained unaltered despite the Attorney-General and others 
pointing out that that Select Committee would "need to look very carefully" at cl 93.169 
Given that the Bill is lengthy and concerns a topic that is unlikely to attract the public's 
attention, it appears that MPs are paying it little attention.170 The lax attitude towards 
the Commission's recommendations is problematic given the constitutional importance 
of judicial appointments. It is unfortunate that the Commission's measured reforms, 
which would enhance the transparency of the appointments process and ensure greater 
consistency in its application, were largely rejected without sufficient explanation. 
Although the changes are welcome, and are an appropriate response to current 
concerns about judicial appointments, they are not sufficient to address the issues 
raised in this paper because the Attorney-General would retain wide discretion over 
appointments. The subdued nature of the recommendations was recognised by the 
Commission; its focus was "a modest consolidation project".171 Therefore, it is 
necessary to go beyond the Judicature Modernisation Bill to seek more comprehensive 
options for reform. 
B Election 
Although some jurisdictions, notably many American states, opt to elect judges, this 
undermines the independence of the judiciary and with it the rule of law. Election is 
unlikely to be favoured in New Zealand and can be dismissed as a legitimate option for 
reform. Friedland, although writing in the Canadian context, aptly described the case 
against electing judges:172 
Few things would be more destructive of the independence of the judiciary than 
to have judges campaign for office accepting contributions to pay for their 
campaigns, let alone having to run on a law-and-order platform. 
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C Formal Training 
Similarly the civil law model where judges are formally trained in a separate career 
path to lawyers will not be adopted. New Zealand's common law tradition, where most 
judges have had at least 15 years of experience in legal practice, is very likely to be 
retained in the future. Any reform must conform to this tradition.  
D  Public Legislative Hearings 
Legislative hearings at which nominees are questioned by elected representatives take 
place in Canada and the United States. Under this reform, the present system of 
appointment would be retained but a candidate selected by the Attorney-General 
would appear before a committee of MPs, most likely the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee, prior to being officially appointed by the Governor-General. The varying 
forms that legislative hearings could take are discussed below, but ultimately it is 
contended that public hearings are not a desirable reform. 
The American model for Supreme Court confirmation hearings should not be adopted 
in New Zealand. Given that the hearings are conducted publicly and Senators can 
block a Supreme Court nominee, the hearings are characterised by aggressive 
questioning and politicking.173  
An alternative model, adopted in Canada, is a public hearing at which MPs question 
appointees but cannot vote. The fact that MPs cannot vote on the nomination "lowers 
the temperature" of the hearing and purportedly makes the occasion less politicised.174 
However, because a government can insist on its nominee regardless of the hearing's 
outcome, the process comes across as superficial rather than as a real check on the 
Attorney-General. As MPs could not vote to show their opposition to a candidate, they 
are more likely to publicly express their concerns, which would be damaging to the 
candidate if they were nevertheless appointed.  
Furthermore, the absence of voting is no guarantee that MPs would behave 
appropriately. Although the first Canadian hearing was conducted politely, in 2011 
SCC appointee Michael Moldaver was subjected to "glib and disrespectful challenges" 
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concerning his inability to speak French; he was asked over five times about this issue 
and was asked one question in French, an approach surely meant only to embarrass 
him.175 The presence of a Canadian constitutional expert moderating the session did 
not prevent these sorts of attacks. Unfortunately, New Zealand's political culture and 
the ubiquity of inflammatory rhetoric means that MPs would be likely to behave 
similarly and undermine the value of the process, using it as an opportunity to score 
political points. Therefore, public legislative hearings in either the American or 
Canadian model should not be adopted in New Zealand.  
VII Private Confirmation 
Given the problems associated with public confirmation hearings, an alternative 
reform would create a private process through which an individual or group confirms 
the suitability of the appointment. Under this model, the Attorney-General would 
nominate one individual for judicial appointment, with the same consultative process 
as is presently adopted. His or her nominee would be appointed by the Governor-
General only if the individual or committee confirmed the appointment. If the 
nomination was rejected, the Attorney-General would be required to submit a new 
candidate. 
A Composition 
Approval of the Attorney-General's nomination could come either from a Judge, a 
group of MPs, or a specifically constituted committee. The Law Commission raised 
the possibility that the concurrence of the Chief Justice or relevant Head of Bench 
could be required, creating a judicial veto over appointments.176 The problem with this 
approach is two-fold; first, a judicial veto risks self-perpetuation within the judiciary 
given the inclination among judges towards more conservative choices, and secondly, 
it does too little to enhance the transparency and democratic legitimacy of the process. 
An alternative would require the nominee to appear before a private confirmation 
hearing conducted by MPs – likely the Justice and Electoral Select Committee. The 
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absence of public exposure would reduce the incentive for politicking, permitting a 
more productive session than the previously discussed public hearings. 
However, if the governing party and its support partners held a majority on the Select 
Committee, the process may lack the necessary rigour to create a real check sufficient 
to stop political opponents from publicly criticising appointments. A group of MPs 
may also give weight to peripheral considerations rather than the candidate's legal 
ability and suitability for appointment. For example, Justice Rothstein derived support 
from Canadian MPs for being "very 'judge-like'"177 and for "his informality, self-
deprecating sense of humour, and willingness to explain his judicial philosophy in 
simple terms".178 
The involvement of a number of MPs also increases the risk that information would be 
leaked to the media if politically expedient, particularly if a minority of the committee 
members were opposed to the nominee. The heightened risk of leaks is problematic as 
it may deter good candidates from seeking judicial office.  
A third option is the creation of a specifically constituted committee responsible for 
approving the Attorney-General's decision. This committee would be likely to include 
the Chief Justice and Solicitor-General, as representatives of the bench and bar, and 
could include lay members and MPs. 
B Advantages and Disadvantages 
Retaining the Attorney-General as the primary decision-maker will be seen by 
proponents of this model as its main advantage. Ministerial responsibility is not diluted 
so the conventions that presently govern appointments can continue to operate, but 
with a genuine check on the Attorney-General's exercise of discretion. The committee 
could also provide feedback to the Attorney-General if it were concerned about, for 
example, the homogeneity of appointments. The committee's voting power and ability 
to reject a candidate means that it cannot be dismissed as a mere process of rubber 
stamping. 
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However, the central role of the Attorney-General is also this proposal's main 
weakness. One of the main problems with the present system is the concentration of 
decision-making power in one person. It is hard to justify why one individual, even a 
government minister, should have this level of influence over the judiciary's 
composition, especially when judges' powers are substantially wider under a supreme 
law BORA. This reform does too little to change that. Because the committee cannot 
propose individuals for appointment, but can solely approve or reject the Attorney-
General's nomination, its influence is fairly limited.  
The process is also likely to be seen as insufficiently independent of the government to 
enhance the perception that judicial appointments are politically neutral and quell 
political attacks on appointees. Although the involvement of MPs would add to the 
non-political nature of appointments, given the weakness of the committee this is 
insufficient to nullify concerns about the government's control of the process. Thus the 
benefit of this proposal, that it retains aspects of the present system which work well, 
is also its main drawback. The committee is too weak to sufficiently balance the power 
of the Attorney-General. 
VIII Appointments Commission 
An appointments commission is a prominent option for reform; commissions have 
been adopted with increased frequency offshore, notably in the United Kingdom.179 A 
commission has been proposed in New Zealand on several occasions, first by the 1978 
Royal Commission on the Courts, whose suggestion was opposed by the judiciary and 
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was not enacted.180 In the 1990s the idea resurfaced and derived support from Sir 
Robin Cooke, then President of the Court of Appeal, and Sir Thomas Eichelbaum, then 
Chief Justice.181 
The issue arose again in 2004. A number of submissions on the legislation creating the 
Supreme Court expressed distrust of the existing system and supported the formation 
of a judicial appointments commission.182  Although the Ministry of Justice produced a 
consultation paper on the matter, ultimately this idea was not pursued.183 Then 
Attorney-General Margaret Wilson is still supportive of the creation of an independent 
body to recommend appointments.184 
A Appointing or Recommending Commission 
There are broadly two models that an appointments commission could adopt. Under 
the first, the commission has total responsibility for the appointment and would 
directly advise the Governor-General on the candidate to be appointed. The second, 
which is adopted more commonly overseas, operates as a recommending commission, 
which produces a shortlist from which the Attorney-General selects whom to 
appoint.185 
The primary disadvantage of the first model, where the Attorney-General is not 
involved, is the reduction in accountability to Parliament. Former Chief Justice of 
Australia, Sir Anthony Mason, suggested that:186 
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… there is a powerful democratic argument against transferring the power of 
appointment away from the executive government to a commission consisting of 
persons who are not elected by the people. One justification for the exercise of 
judicial power by non-elected Judges in a democracy is that the Judges are 
indirectly appointed by the people in that it is the duly elected government that 
makes the appointments. That is a very important argument which tells against 
entrusting the power of appointment to others, whatever the advantages may be of 
pursuing such a course.  
Although arguing against an appointments commission, Mason's statement suggests 
that, if a commission is implemented, involving the Attorney-General in some capacity 
is necessary to avoid an undesirable reduction in democratic legitimacy. This is 
particularly important given the heightened need to protect the democratic legitimacy 
of judges who are able to strike down laws passed by Parliament. Although the 
inclusion of MPs on the commission would impart some responsibility to Parliament, 
this alone would provide weaker accountability than the direct ministerial 
responsibility created by the Attorney-General's involvement. 
The concern in the United Kingdom, which could apply equally in New Zealand, was 
that by removing the Lord Chancellor from appointments, he or she would "cease to 
operate so effectively as a bridge between the judiciary and Government".187 
Removing the Attorney-General from the appointments process may also make him or 
her less inclined to defend the judiciary against criticism.188 Therefore, given the 
tension that exists between creating a body which is independent of government while 
still ensuring accountability to Parliament, a commission with total responsibility for 
appointments errs too far towards independence at the expense of accountability. 
The recommending commission model also has benefits when considering the quality 
of candidates appointed for judicial office. Critics of an appointments commission 
have expressed concern that it will encourage the appointment of conventional, 
compromise candidates.189 In contrast, the Attorney-General is well placed to make 
unconventional appointments and choose candidates with unorthodox backgrounds 
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189  See Stevens, above n 186, at 144; and Allan, above n 10, at 110. 
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because he or she has the benefit of seeing the courts in their wider social and political 
context.190 This issue is a particular problem given the increased importance of 
diversity of experience among judges once a supreme law BORA is enacted. Tasking 
the commission with the creation of a shortlist, rather than recommending a single 
name, goes some way to mitigating this concern by ensuring greater scope for the 
commission to select individuals other than the most obvious and conventional 
candidates. 
Furthermore, Malleson contends that the risk of compromise appointments is 
predominantly of concern in highly politicised appointments systems.  There is 
evidence from commissions in the United States of "the rejection of dynamic, higher-
risk candidates in favour of bland, safe appointments".191  However, she contends that 
this situation must be seen in context. As American appointments commissions have 
usually replaced a system of electing judges, and as commission members are typically 
divided along political lines, the selection of compromise candidates often results. 
Thus Malleson argues that the risk of a similar outcome in countries that do not have 
an underlying culture of politicised appointments is remote.192 
One contentious matter is whether the Attorney-General should be bound to accept the 
commission's shortlist. Eichelbaum suggested that the Attorney-General should be free 
to make an appointment from outside the commission's shortlist, but that this would 
need to be publicly notified.193 However, this approach undermines the value of the 
reform, given that the predominant concern with the present system is that there are 
too few formal checks on the Attorney-General. It is instead preferable to require the 
Attorney-General to select a candidate from the commission's shortlist, but he or she 
should be able to ask the commission to reevaluate its recommendation. The grounds 
on which the Attorney-General can ask for reconsideration should be clearly 
established and reasons for the decision should be required.194 A shortlist of three 
  
190  Palmer, above n 8, at 82. Also see the discussion of this issue in Straw, above n 36, at 75. 
191  Kate Malleson "The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in 
New Botttles" in Kate Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial 
Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2006) 
39 at 45.  
192  Malleson, above n 191, at 45.  
193  Eichelbaum, above n 81, at 429.  
194  See Kate Malleson "Creating a Judicial Appointments Commission: Which Model Works Best" 
[2004] Public Law 102 at 113 for a further discussion of this matter.   
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names would be appropriate; fewer than three names places too significant a limit on 
the Attorney-General, while allowing more than three names risks undermining the 
value of the commission as a limit on the exercise of discretion. 
B Composition 
A commission's composition and how its members are to be appointed are two of the 
most contentious issues regarding appointments commissions. In particular, there is 
concern that appointments to the commission may themselves become politicised and 
that the commission will be unduly dominated by judges, leading to self-replication 
within the judiciary. The following discussion explains these concerns and contends 
that the composition of the commission can alleviate them. 
1 Political Appointments to the Commission 
Critics suggest that appointments to the commission itself may become politicised. 
They are concerned that the political element could simply shift and operate in a more 
covert manner; members of the government may attempt to stack the commission to 
ensure their preferred candidates are selected.195 
This situation appears to have occurred in Canada, where appointments commissions 
are used for federal judicial appointments below the SCC level, and in many 
provinces. In 2006 the federal government added a police representative to each 
commission, which was seen as an attempt to ensure the appointment of "tough on 
crime" judges.196 The judicial representative was also restricted from voting except in 
cases of a tie. This gave the government the power to appoint a majority of the voting 
members of the commission and was heavily criticised.197 These changes illustrate the 
need for a bipartisan approach to reform, to avoid as much as possible later alterations 
of the commission's composition. 
The appointments commission for England and Wales attempts to alleviate concerns 
about the way members are appointed but in an administratively burdensome way. 
  
195  Palmer, above n 8, at 82; East, above n 9, at 190.  
196  Friedland, above n 29, at 55. 
197  Friedland, above n 29, at 55–56. For example, the Canadian Judicial Council said that the reform 
"puts in peril the concept of an independent body that advises the government on who is best 
qualified to be a judge". 
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Their 15-person commission is comprised of six lay people, five judges (taken from 
the different levels of court), one solicitor, one barrister, and two lay judges (one 
magistrate and one tribunal member).198 The three most senior judicial members are 
appointed by the Judges' Council, while other commissioners are appointed by the 
Lord Chancellor after consultation with an advisory body comprising the Lord Chief 
Justice, the chair of the Commission and an additional lay member appointed by the 
Minister.199 While this diminishes concerns about politicised appointments to the 
commission, creating a separate advisory committee responsible for appointing 
members of the appointments commission is cumbersome. The high administrative 
burden is exacerbated by New Zealand's small size and comparatively limited 
resources. 
A better and simpler solution is for individuals to sit on the commission by virtue of 
another office they hold. Rather than making specific appointments to the commission, 
the Solicitor-General for example would automatically become a member by virtue of 
being Solicitor-General.  
The Ministry of Justice's 2004 Consultation Paper suggested the following 
composition for a commission:200 
 Three lay people, who are not practising lawyers and have never held judicial office; 
 The Chief Justice (or nominee, who is a judge); 
 One other senior judge (for example the Chief Judge of the Court in which the 
vacancy occurs); 
 The President of the New Zealand Law Society (or nominee); 
 The President of the New Zealand Bar Association (or nominee); and 
 One of the following persons:201 
o The Solicitor-General (or Deputy Solicitor-General); 
o The Secretary of Justice (or nominee); 
o The Chief Executive of Te Puni Kōkiri (or nominee). 
  
198  Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK), sch 12. 
199  Sophie Turenne "Judicial Independence in England and Wales" in Anja Seibert-Fohr (ed) Judicial 
Independence in Transition (Springer, Heidelberg, 2012) 147 at 158–159. 
200  Ministry of Justice, above n 46, at [78]–[79].  
201  The Consultation Paper proposed that the individual involved would depend on whether the 
appointment was to the superior courts (Solicitor-General); the District Court, including the Family 
and Youth Courts and the Employment and Environment Courts (Secretary of Justice); or the 
Māori Land Court (Chief Executive of Te Puni Kōkiri). 
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The majority of these individuals would sit on the appointments commission by virtue 
of another role, whether as a senior member of the judiciary, a public servant, or as 
head of one of the legal associations. This circumvents the difficulties that arise when 
deciding which individuals, for example which judges or bar representatives, should be 
included. 
However, problems arise in respect of lay members. Given the aforementioned risk of 
politicised appointments, it is not desirable for the government to appoint three lay 
members to the commission, as proposed in the 2004 Consultation Paper. One solution 
would be for lay members to also be appointed by virtue of an office they hold; for 
example, the Auditor-General or an Ombudsman could be members of the 
commission.  It is suggested here that a better solution is for no lay members to sit on 
the commission. 
2 Lay Members 
Many appointments commissions include a number of lay members, with some 
comprised of a majority of lay members while other are chaired by a lay member.202 
The argument for including lay members is that they bring fresh ideas and perspectives 
to the commission to balance the influence of judges who may otherwise dominate its 
decisions and encourage self-replication within the judiciary.203 
Others hold a contrary view; that the commission will be captured by judicial 
representatives, leading to safe and conservative picks.204 Palmer, for example, 
expressed concern that judges who sat on the commission would exert great weight on 
the opinion of lay members, suggesting this risks "turn[ing] the judiciary into a self 
perpetuating oligarchy".205 
A better mechanism for balancing the influence of judicial representatives is the 
inclusion of representatives from the bar. The Solicitor-General and Presidents of the 
  
202  See Malleson, above n 191, at 48.  
203  Malleson, above n 191, at 48. 
204  See East, above n 9, at 190; and Palmer, above n 8, at 81–82. Allan has expressed a similar concern 
regarding the appointments commission for England and Wales; see Allan, above n 93, at 80. 
205  Palmer, above n 8, at 82. Allan similarly expressed concern that the appointments commission for 
England and Wales would promote the appointment of "an insulated, self-selecting lawyerly caste"; 
see Allan, above n 93, at 81. 
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Bar Association and Law Society are less likely to be unduly influenced by judges on 
the commission precisely because they are not lay members. As legally trained 
representatives of the bar they are well-positioned to assess the legal ability of 
candidates, for example the quality of the legal reasoning in their judgments, whereas 
lay members may be more likely to defer to judicial representatives on these matters. 
3 Members of Parliament 
Members of Parliament should sit on the commission, as occurs in several countries 
including South Africa and Israel.206 As the central democratic authority, Parliament 
has a valid interest in judicial appointments, particularly when judges have the ability 
to strike down legislation. Malleson contends that including MPs on a commission 
increases democratic accountability and hence the legitimacy of the process.207 It 
would be likely to also increase the democratic legitimacy of judges in the eyes of the 
public. Canada's experience showed a strong desire for MPs to be involved in 
appointments post-Charter. If legislative hearings are not implemented in New Zealand 
– and there are good policy reasons why they should not be – another mechanism 
should be established for involving MPs. 
Shutting MPs out of the process also runs counter to the goal of limiting political 
eruptions or sensations in response to appointments and unpopular judgments. Without 
their inclusion, the commission is at risk of being viewed as too insular as all members 
would be part of the legal establishment. Thus by increasing the democratic legitimacy 
of the judiciary and reducing the likelihood of politicised attacks on judicial 
appointments, there are reasons of both principle and pragmatism for including MPs 
on the commission.  
The view that the commission should not include lay members strengthens the 
argument for including MPs. Like the Attorney-General, MPs see the courts within 
their broader social and political context, which may direct the commission towards 
more unorthodox appointments. Including MPs on the commission also further 
mitigates the risk of disproportionate judicial influence. 
  
206  Malleson, above n 194, at 118. 
207  Malleson, above n 194, at 118. 
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Critics will point out that MPs already have the ability to oversee appointments and 
could, for example, conduct a Select Committee examination of the appointments 
process. However, the fact that this mechanism has not been used does not mean that 
MPs will be unconcerned about appointments in future. Once judges are able to strike 
down laws enacted by Parliament, the interest in appointments and demand for 
involvement is likely to substantially increase, as was the case in Canada. 
As with the previously discussed reforms, the involvement of MPs increases the risk 
that confidential information may be leaked. Compared with a post-appointment 
legislative hearing, the risk is lower here because fewer MPs are involved. While this 
concern still exists, it is managed and outweighed by the benefit brought by their 
inclusion. 
C The Case for an Appointments Commission 
The forgoing discussion illustrates how several of the most common critiques of an 
appointments commission – that it will be captured by judges, or that appointments to 
the commission will be politicised – can largely be mitigated by its composition. 
Drawing on that discussion and other considerations, this section contends that an 
appointments commission is the best option for New Zealand. 
The primary advantage of the commission is that it enhances the political neutrality of 
appointments by shifting decision-making power away from a member of the 
government to an independent body. At present, the political neutrality of the process 
will inevitably be questioned, regardless of how impartial appointments are in practice, 
because a government minister has largely unchecked control over appointments.208 
Shifting responsibility to an independent commission therefore achieves two of the 
main policy goals; it creates a genuine check on the Attorney-General, reducing his or 
her ability to stack a court with ideological appointments, and enhances the perception 
that this will not occur. 
An appointments commission is more effective in this regard than a form of committee 
confirmation. Under that model, the committee is too weak to effectively balance the 
Attorney-General's power over the process. 
  
208  See Jowell, above n 82, at 3. 
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Another advantage of an appointments commission is its transparency and 
inclusiveness. Legislative hearings offer transparency because they are open to the 
public. The transparency of an appointments commission is of a different nature; it is 
derived from the commission providing an inclusive, consistent process which 
operates independently of the government for both appointments and elevations. This 
is a significant benefit in a society that questions authority figures and demands more 
transparency.209 
The existing system does not seek to elicit support for appointments from members of 
the legislature whose laws would eventually be reviewed.210 With a supreme law 
BORA this weakness becomes more significant, given the risk that judges may be 
viewed as too powerful compared to elected representatives. Involving MPs is 
valuable because it elicits Parliament's support for appointments without creating the 
problems associated with legislative hearings. This also reduces the risk that political 
actors will publicly attack or sensationalise appointments and the appointments 
process. 
Some commentators argue that a commission will not remove the risk of politicised 
appointments. Their concern is that a shortlist created by an advisory commission 
"does not diminish or curtail patronage, but 'aids and abets' it by supplying the 
[member of the executive] with cover to take partisan considerations into account".211 
Palmer and East both expressed concern about the division of responsibility and 
corresponding lack of accountability that an appointments commission brings.212 It is 
easier to question the propriety of a discretionary appointment made by one person 
than to question the decisions of an ostensibly independent commission, where the 
division of decision-making power means that accountability can be offloaded to 
others involved.213 
This is a legitimate concern, but needs to be weighed against the countervailing 
desirability of creating a more open and inclusive appointments process. By spreading 
  
209  See Eichelbaum, above n 81, at 421. 
210  Jowell, above n 82, at 3.  
211  Gee, above n 33, at 107. Also see FC DeCoste "Political Corruption, Judicial Selection and the 
Rule of Law" (2000) 38 Alta L Rev 654 at 675. 
212  Palmer, above n 8, at 82; and East, above n 9, at 190.  
213  Allan, above n 10, at 116. 
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the decision-making power among a group of people, inevitably the accountability of 
each individual is reduced. That is the cost of a more inclusive and transparent system. 
Furthermore, even if political factors did affect the Attorney-General's selection from 
the shortlist, the commission's value would not be negated. As discussed above, 
complete impartiality is impossible as there are some political matters which will 
inevitably factor into appointments. The value of the commission is that the political 
element is managed and limited. An Attorney-General would not be able to stack the 
court with ideologically driven candidates; to be included on the shortlist, the 
commission must have confirmed that a candidate is well qualified. Thus, regardless of 
which individual is selected from the shortlist, and the reasons for that decision, the 
public and Parliament can be confident that the appointee is suitable.  
Proponents argue that an appointments commission will increase diversity on the 
bench.214 While some commentators contend that the appointments commission for 
England and Wales has successfully increased diversity,215 others argue that this 
reform is not a panacea for increasing diversity. Sundeep Iyer found an increase in 
female appointments in the first year of the commission's operation, but that this 
increase vanished shortly thereafter.216  Creating a commission was not itself enough 
to address concerns about a lack of diversity; commissions are "not the cure that 
politicians have sought ".217 
Instead, sustained initiatives directly targeted towards this issue are necessary if greater 
diversity is to be achieved. For example, in Ontario the appointments commission 
directed that a letter be sent to all 1,200 senior women lawyers in the province asking 
  
214  See the discussion in Malleson, above n 191, at 42–44.  
215  Baroness Usha Prashar "Translating Aspirations into Reality: Establishing the Judicial 
Appointments Commission" in Judicial Appointments: Balancing Independence, Accountability 
and Legitimacy (Judicial Appointments Commission, 2010) 41 at 51–52. 
216  Sundeep Iyer "The fleeting benefits of appointments commissions for judicial gender equality" 
(2013) 51 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 97. Also see Kate Malleson "Diversity in the 
Judiciary: The Case For Positive Action" (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 376 for similar 
findings on the failure of the appointments commission for England and Wales to increase diversity 
as hoped. 
217  Iyer, above n 216, at 117. Commenting on the appointments commission for England and Wales, 
Straw similarly said that "[t]he assumption regarding diversity – naïve, as it turned out – was that if 
we changed the process, we would change the outcome"; Straw, above n 36, at 54. 
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them to consider applying for judicial office. This produced a marked increase in the 
number of female applicants.218 Thus targeted initiatives towards increasing diversity 
are likely to be more effective than simply changing the method of appointments. 
Given the divergence of academic opinion, increasing the diversity of the bench does 
not provide a strong argument either in support of or against of an appointments 
commission. 
However, concerns that an appointments commission will give judges undue influence 
and impede the appointment of unconventional candidates are mitigated by the 
composition and powers of the proposed commission. The inclusion of MPs and bar 
representatives is likely to balance judicial influence. Furthermore, the fact that the 
commission's responsibility is to create a shortlist rather than recommend a single 
name ensures greater scope for the commission to select unorthodox candidates. 
The cost and administrative burden of an appointments commission is often cited as a 
disadvantage.219 The appointments commission for England and Wales, responsible for 
nominating more than 700 judges each year, has 15 commissioners and a significant 
support staff.220 Its total expenditure in 2013/14 was £5.59 million.221 In contrast, New 
Zealand appoints about 12 judges annually.222 Yet despite the differences in size, 
concerns about ensuring neutrality and increasing transparency are equally important 
in New Zealand as in the United Kingdom.  
It is indisputable that an appointments commission would impose administrative 
burdens on those involved, which would need to be supported with sufficient 
  
218  Malleson, above n 191, at 43. 
219  Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a Consolidated Courts Act (NZLC 
IP29, 2012) at [3.20]. 
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56  
 
appropriations.223 However the low number of appointments annually eases the burden 
on members, most of which are already involved with appointments to some degree.224  
D Administrative Aspects 
This section outlines some administrative matters which would contribute to the 
success of an appointments commission in New Zealand. The initial process could be 
managed by the Solicitor-General, as currently occurs. Similar levels of consultation, 
with members of the commission and those outside it, would ensure that a wide range 
of candidates was considered. In consultation with the members of the commission, a 
database of qualified candidates would be created. The primary responsibility of the 
commission would then be reviewing this database to create a shortlist of three 
candidates. 
Palmer proposed the creation of an office within Crown Law, headed by a new Deputy 
Solicitor-General, to provide support on judicial appointments.225 The functions of the 
office would include calling for expressions of interest, holding confidential files on 
future candidates, managing the interview process and conducting referee checks. 
Although this was recommended in the context of the present appointments system it 
could equally be adopted as the administrative and support component of an 
appointments commission. 
There should be provision for two MPs to sit on the commission. To ensure that the 
MPs are seen as representing Parliament, one should be drawn from within the 
governing parties and one from within the parties in opposition. The statute could 
provide that two MPs are to be designated members of the commission by the Prime 
Minister and by the Leader of the Opposition. Although it is likely that those appointed 
would be legally qualified, this should not be required as other experience, for example 
in making other public appointments, would also be valuable. Commentary on the 
  
223  See Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court "Submission on the Judicature Modernisation 
Bill" (2014) at [8], which expressed concern at additional administrative requirements being 
imposed on the Chief Justice and others which were not being supported by sufficient resource 
allocations.   
224  The exceptions to this are the two MPs, although the shadow Attorney-General and chairperson of 
the Justice and Electoral Select Committee may be consulted under the existing appointments 
process, see Ministry of Justice, above n 49. 
225  Chen Palmer & Partners, above n 23, at [7]–[17].  
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legislation could suggest that the shadow Attorney-General and chairperson of the 
Justice and Electoral Select Committee should be considered for appointment first; 
they are obvious candidates for inclusion as both tend to be consulted during the 
existing judicial appointments process. 
The appointments commission should operate for appointment and elevations to all 
courts, as was suggested in the 2004 Consultation Paper.226 Some flexibility in the 
commission's composition is necessary to accommodate the burden that it places on its 
members, so the commission's membership would partly depend on the court in which 
the vacancy arose. The Consultation Paper proposed a desirable degree of flexibility in 
recommending that in addition to the Chief Justice, the second judge involved would 
vary and could be the head of the bench of the court in which the vacancy occurs.227 
Given the administrative burden, this is preferable to requiring the various heads of 
bench to all sit on the commission for all appointments. The Consultation Paper also 
suggested that commission members could nominate another individual to take their 
place; this is necessary because it would be unreasonable to expect the Chief Justice, 
for example, to sit on the commission for all judicial appointments. 
IX Conclusion  
The enactment of a supreme law BORA in New Zealand would enhance the 
importance of judicial independence and lead to increased scrutiny of the method of 
appointing judges. Canada's experience after enacting the Charter indicates that New 
Zealand's existing appointments system will need to be reformed. The present 
appointments process lacks transparency, can operate in an ad hoc manner, and gives 
wide discretion to the Attorney-General, whose integrity is the main safeguard against 
improperly political appointments. Given the increased incentive for politicised 
appointments under a supreme law BORA, this process does not sufficiently protect 
the neutrality of appointments. 
The latter parts of this paper evaluated alternative methods of appointing judges. The 
Canadian case study suggests that any reform adopted must be proactive, codified, 
  
226  Ministry of Justice, above n 46, at [5]; see the discussion at [6]–[7] about proposed exceptions to 
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bipartisan and responsive to the issues raised. Reform of judicial appointments should 
aim to increase public confidence in the independence and democratic legitimacy of 
the judiciary, provide safeguards to prevent improperly political appointments and, to 
reduce the risk of public attacks on the judiciary, enhance the perception that political 
appointments will not occur. 
The forgoing discussion showed that several of the criteria by which appointments 
systems were assessed are in tension, for example reform that enhances independence 
from the government inevitably reduces accountability to Parliament. As a result, no 
reform will attract universal support; the reform favoured depends to an extent on 
which values are prioritised over others. 
This paper contends that the best option for reform is a judicial appointments 
commission in the form of a recommending body that supplies a shortlist of candidates 
to the Attorney-General. This creates a genuine check on the Attorney-General and, in 
doing so, enhances the perception that appointees are well-qualified and chosen based 
on merit. This perception will increase public confidence in the independence of the 
judiciary and help to protect judges from political attacks. The Attorney-General's 
retention of discretion and the involvement of MPs in the process enhances the 
democratic legitimacy of the judiciary, a particularly important feature given that 
judges will have the power to strike down laws passed by Parliament. 
Although the present system of appointing judges has operated effectively in the 
current context, it is insufficiently robust to withstand the additional pressure 
inevitably placed upon it if a supreme law BORA were enacted. Accordingly, the 
adoption of a supreme law BORA should be accompanied by the creation of a judicial 
appointments commission in New Zealand. 
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